Executive Labor Market Segmentation: How Local Market Density Affects Incentives and Performance by Zhao, Hong (Author) et al.
Executive Labor Market Segmentation:
How Local Market Density Affects Incentives and Performance
by
Hong Zhao
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Approved April 2017 by the
Graduate Supervisory Committee:
Michael Hertzel, Chair
Ilona Babenka
Jeffrey Coles
Luke Stein
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY
May 2017
ABSTRACT
I study how the density of executive labor markets affects managerial incentives and
thereby firm performance. I find that U.S. executive markets are locally segmented
rather than nationally integrated, and that the density of a local market provides
executives with non-compensation incentives. Empirical results show that in denser
labor markets, executives face stronger performance-based dismissal threats as well
as better outside opportunities. These incentives result in higher firm performance
in denser markets, especially when executives have longer career horizons. Using
state-level variation in the enforceability of covenants not to compete, I find that
the positive effects of market density on incentive alignment and firm performance
are stronger in markets where executives are freer to move. This evidence further
supports the argument that local labor market density works as an external incentive
alignment mechanism.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Recent empirical findings suggest that geographic factors play an important role in
managerial compensation schemes. Francis et al. (2016) find a positive relation be-
tween the size of the city where a firm is headquartered and its Chief Executive
Officer’s (CEO’s) total as well as equity compensation. Bouwman (2013) shows that
CEO compensation is highly influenced by the average compensation level of other
CEOs in the local area. Yet, little is known about whether geographic factors also
affect non-compensation incentives for executives.
Previous literature shows that non-compensation incentives, including dismissal
threat and promotion based tournament incentives, are important sources of man-
agerial incentive alignment. For example, Jenter and Lewellen (2014) show a strong
relation between firm performance and CEO turnover and indicate that nearly 40%
of turnovers are performance induced. Nielsen (2016) finds that dismissed CEOs ex-
perience a 40% annual income decline in the five years following turnovers. With
respect to tournament incentives, a survey by Graham et al. (2005) shows that 75%
of executives agree that the desire to meet earnings targets is driven more by upward
mobility in labor markets than by short-term compensation schemes. Moreover, both
theoretical and empirical studies show that these non-compensation incentives have
positive effects on firm performance (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Kale et al., 2009).
In this paper, I study how one specific geographic characteristic—local labor mar-
ket density—affects managerial non-compensation incentives. In denser labor mar-
kets, executives might face stronger dismissal threat because of local competition,
and stronger tournament incentives because of external opportunities. At the same
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time, market density might reduce executives’ incentives by providing more backup
options in the event of dismissal. The primary goal of this paper is to test empirically
the existence or non-existence of the above channels and examine how market density
affects firm performance through managerial incentive alignment.
One condition necessary for local market density to be important is the presence
of geographic segmentation in executive labor markets. 1 If executives tend to move
within one large national market rather than many small local markets, then all ex-
ecutives will face the same labor market conditions. To examine whether there is
geographic segmentation in U.S. executive labor markets, I use a sample of executive
job changes covered by the BoardEx database, and regard a job change (i.e., a hiring)
within 60 miles as local. If markets were nationally integrated and firms hired execu-
tives randomly from a nationwide pool, then on average, local hirings should account
for only 5% of the hirings in the sample. However, the data show that the realized
local hiring percentage is 34%, indicating a large bias in local hiring and rejecting the
nationwide market hypothesis at the 1% level. This local hiring bias remains large
and significant even after adjustment for industry clustering.
Based on the evidence of geographic segmentation, I then turn to the main analy-
sis on how local labor market density affects executives’ non-compensation incentives,
with market density measured as the number of firms within 60 miles of a firm’s head-
quarters. The first channel of managerial incentive alignment tested is performance-
based dismissal threat. Since firms tend to hire executives locally, a market with
higher density provides firms with more local outside candidates, thereby allowing
them to make more credible dismissal threat to their incumbent executives. Con-
sistent with this hypothesis, empirical results show that CEO turnover-performance
1The U.S. executive labor markets are commonly viewed as very mobile. Kedia and Rajgopal
(2009) write “it is difficult to argue that top executives are geographically immobile” (p. 125). Yet,
some recent empirical findings challenge this view. See, for example, Ang et al. (2013), Bouwman
(2013), Yonker (2016), and Francis et al. (2016).
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sensitivity is significantly higher in denser labor markets, implying stronger dismissal
threat for executives therein. In addition, when replacing incumbent executives, firms
in denser markets are more likely to hire outsiders rather than promote insiders. This
result offers further support for the argument that convenient access to external can-
didates is the reason for higher turnover-performance sensitivity in denser markets.
In addition to the threat of dismissal, outside tournament opportunities are an-
other potential source of executives’ non-compensation incentives. Since there are
more potential outside job advancements in denser markets, there should also ex-
ist higher tournament incentives for executives. To capture tournament incentives,
I consider both the size of the tournament prize, i.e., the expected compensation
increase when an executive moves to another local firm, and the likelihood of tour-
nament, i.e., how often tournaments occur in a local market. Empirically, the results
show that both the prize and likelihood of local outside tournaments are significantly
higher in denser labor markets. All else equal, an interquartile increase in market
density almost triples and doubles the tournament prize and tournament likelihood,
respectively.
Both dismissal threat and outside tournament work as channels through which
market density improves managerial incentive alignment. However, there also might
be a channel of incentive misalignment, if executives in denser markets have more
backup options in the event of dismissal. I test this channel with a sample of exec-
utives who lost their jobs and examine their subsequent employment outcomes in a
three-year window based on news articles. Regression results indicate that dismissed
executives in denser markets do not find new jobs more easily, obtain positions with
higher compensation, or experience shorter unemployment durations. One possible
explanation is that dismissed executives are forced to leave their local markets as
reputation spreads locally. I find empirical evidence supporting this explanation.
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Compared to executives who change jobs voluntarily, dismissed executives are signif-
icantly less likely to find their next job in the local market.
Given that market density improves executive incentive alignment, a natural ques-
tion is whether density also enhances firm performance. The empirical challenge here
is that market density could have an effect on performance through various channels,
so a simple positive correlation between these two variables does not suffice. 2 The
method I adopt is to interact market density with executives’ career horizons. The
logic, as argued in Gibbons and Murphy (1992), is that executives with shorter career
horizons (i.e., those closer to retirement) should be less responsive to dismissal threats
and tournament incentives. Using age as a proxy of career horizon, I find that the
coefficient of the interaction term between market density and executive horizon is
significantly positive in performance regressions. In other words, the positive effect
of market density on firm performance is stronger for firms with younger executives.
In terms of economic magnitude, firms with market density in the top quartile and
executive age in the bottom quartile have a 0.27 (0.017) higher industry-adjusted
Tobin’s Q (return on assets) than firms with market density in the bottom quartile
and executive age in the top quartile. These results support the argument that exec-
utives in denser markets exert more effort in response to stronger non-compensation
incentives, thereby leading to higher firm performance.
As the effects of market density on incentive alignment and firm performance
hinge on executives’ movements within local labor markets, the effects will be weaker
if executives cannot move freely. Restrictions on executive local mobility will shrink
the local outside candidate pool for the firms, as well as the local outside employer
pool for the executives. State-level covenants not to compete are one such restriction
2See Marshall (1920), Duranton and Puga (2004), and Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for economic
foundations of the effects of geographic clustering on firms.
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that prevents a firm’s employees from moving to competing firms. Although almost
all states have some form of noncompete covenants, the enforceability of the covenants
varies widely across states. The variation in the enforceability provides an opportunity
to examine the heterogeneous effects of market density with respect to executive
mobility. Interacting the density measure with the enforceability measure, I find
that the effects of market density on executives’ dismissal threat and tournament
likelihood are more pronounced in markets with higher executive mobility. A three-
way interaction further shows that executive mobility strengthens the career horizon
channel through which density improves firm performance.
In addition to the main findings, I perform a set of robustness checks that con-
sider alternative density measures and address potential confounding factors. This
entails adjusting each firm count by its employment size, as larger firms provide more
job positions, and including local firms in the sample firm’s industry only, as ex-
ecutives often change jobs within industry. The main results remain qualitatively
unchanged with these alternative density measures. One might be concerned that
there exist potential confounding factors correlated with market density, driving the
positive effects of density on incentive alignment and firm performance. For example,
institutional investors, who reduce information asymmetry, tend to gather in denser
markets (Loughran and Schultz, 2005; Boone and White, 2015), and managers with
different abilities could self-sort into different locations. To address such concerns,
the regressions include institutional ownership and analyst coverage to control for the
channel of information dissemination, board independence for monitoring efficiency,
and managerial skill for location sorting of managers. The results show no evidence
that these factors confound the density results. This is consistent with the main re-
gression results on the heterogeneous effects with respect to executive career horizon
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and executive mobility, which also suggest a causal relation between density and both
incentives and firm outcomes.
This paper relates to several streams of research in the finance literature. First,
it contributes to the burgeoning literature on executive market geography. Several
recent studies find geographic patterns in executive compensation structures. Bouw-
man (2013) shows that CEO compensation level is highly correlated with the average
level of local peers. Francis et al. (2016) and Ang et al. (2013) both find that CEOs in
denser markets receive higher compensation, and explain the compensation premium
as a result of a larger CEO local network and higher CEO social pressure in denser
markets, respectively. Although these papers assume implicitly that geographic seg-
mentation exists in executive labor markets, none of them provides a direct test of
the segmentation assumption. 3 Moreover, the literature so far mainly focuses on
executive compensation while pays little attention to non-compensation incentives.
To this extent, this study fills the gap in the literature by documenting the strong ge-
ographical segmentation in U.S. executive labor markets and showing the significant
effect of market density on managerial non-compensation incentives.
My paper also contributes to the literature on managerial incentives. Besides ex-
plicit incentives from compensation contracts (Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Ser-
vaes, 1990; Coles et al., 2012), another source of incentive alignment comes from non-
compensation incentives, including rank-order tournaments and performance-based
dismissal threat. Theoretical foundations of rank-order tournament are developed
by Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Green and Stokey (1983), who show that tourna-
ments can replace performance-based contracts as an incentive mechanism. On the
3Yonker (2016) shows that firms are five times more likely to hire CEOs who grew up in the
same state as firms’ headquarters. Yet, the bias found in Yonker’s paper should be considered as
“home” hiring bias rather than local hiring bias. Suppose a New York firm hires an executive who
grew up in New York and previously worked in Chicago. The hiring is a home hiring but not a local
hiring. Therefore, Yonker’s finding on home hiring bias is not direct evidence on the geographic
segmentation in executive labor markets.
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empirical side, Kale et al. (2009) and Coles et al. (2013) find that both non-CEO ex-
ecutives’ tournament incentives from the within-firm pay gap and CEOs’ tournament
incentives from the within-industry pay gap have positive effects on firm performance.
Like promotions, dismissals also generate incentives. Previous studies find a robust
negative relation between firm stock performance and executive turnover probability,
although the magnitude is modest. 4 Using more relaxed model assumptions, Jenter
and Lewellen (2014) reveal a much larger effect of firm performance on CEO turnover
than do previous studies and argue that performance-induced dismissal threat is an
essential source of incentives. This study contributes to this literature by showing
that one important determinant of the strength of both tournament incentives and
dismissal threat is local labor market density.
Finally, this research extends the literature on the effects of geographic clustering
on firms. Economists have discussed firm location choices and geographic clustering
since Marshall (1920). Marshall theorizes three primary benefits for firms locating
in clusters: knowledge spillovers, labor market pooling, and input providers pooling.
Empirical evidence that support these channels is provided in Glaeser et al. (1992),
Jaffe et al. (1993), Holmes (1999), and Costa and Kahn (2000). On the other hand,
Glaeser (1998) and Tabuchi (1998) show that geographic clustering also can have
negative effects on firms, including transportation congestion, pollution, and crime.
In addition to these economic foundations, geographic clustering also can affect firms
for reasons well established in the finance literature, such as merger and acquisition
opportunities (Almazan et al. (2010)) and shareholder monitoring (John et al. (2011)).
The study most closely related to my paper is Knyazeva et al. (2013). They consider
the size of clusters as a proxy for density of outside director pools and find that firms
4See, among others, Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Warner et al. (1988), Weisbach (1988), Jensen
and Murphy (1990), Denis et al. (1997), Huson et al. (2001), and Kaplan and Minton (2012).
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in denser markets have higher board independence and better performance. My study
considers geographic clustering as a measure of executive market density and shows
that geographic clustering can affect firm outcomes via executives’ non-compensation
incentives.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 examines geographic
segmentation in U.S. executive labor markets. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the main
results related to managerial incentives and firm performance. Chapter 3 studies how
local labor market density affects dismissal threat and outside tournament incentives
for executives. Chapter 4 investigates whether market density improves firm perfor-
mance through incentive alignment. Chapter 5 examines heterogeneity with respect
to state-level covenants not to compete enforceability. Chapter 6 conducts robustness
checks and considers alternative explanations. Chapter 7 concludes.
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Chapter 2
GEOGRAPHIC SEGMENTATION IN U.S. EXECUTIVE LABOR MARKETS
In this section, I document geographic segmentation in U.S. executive labor mar-
kets using data on executive job changes from BoardEx. To deliver robust results, I
calculate local hiring bias for a set of different distance cutoffs and different expected
local hiring probability measures. Appendix B provides further subsample analysis.
2.1 Executive Job Changes Sample
I explore individual employment histories covered by the BoardEx database. BoardEx
provides comprehensive biographical information on individuals who have ever been
listed as either directors or disclosed top earners in large U.S. companies since 2000.
Currently, the database covers about 71% of firms in Compustat, representing 95%
of market capitalization. 1 For each individual in BoardEx, I order her employment
history in a chronological order and record a job change if the employer in year t is
different from the employer in year t + 1. I do not use cases in which there is a year
gap between the end of the old job and the start of the new job. I further restrict job
changes to those between U.S. public firms because location data on private firms are
not readily available. Since larger firms are more likely to search executives nation-
wide (as shown in Appendix B) presumably because they benefit more from finding
1At each report date, an individual’s curriculum vitae is constructed based on the most recent
publicly disclosed information. I explore the employment history contained in the curriculum vitae.
Since the employment history of either directors or top earners mainly contains senior executive
roles in various companies, I call directors and top earners both executives when I refer to their
employment history. More than 90% of employment records in BoardEx are post-1980s. See,
for example, Fracassi and Tate (2012) and Engelberg et al. (2013), for detailed description of the
BoardEx database.
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capable leaders, the local hiring bias documented here based on public firms could be
regarded as a lower bound.
To determine whether an executive’s job change, or equivalently a firm’s job hir-
ing, is local, I calculate the moving distance between an executive’s old firm and new
firm as follows. I first merge BoardEx with Compustat by linking the International
Security Identification Number (ISIN) from BoardEx with the CUSIP from Com-
pustat. For U.S. firms, the ISIN is constructed by adding “US” to the front and a
single-digit check code to the end of the regular nine-digit CUSIP number. I then
merge the zip code of firm’s headquarters from Compustat with the latitude and lon-
gitude of each zip code from the Census 2000 U.S. Gazetteer. 2 Finally, the moving
distance is calculated as the zip code distance between the old firm’s and the new
firm’s headquarters based on the Vincenty formula. 3 Applying the above procedure,
I obtain an analysis sample consisting of 19,692 executive job changes from 16,277
unique executives and 3,743 unique hiring firms.
2.2 Local Hiring Bias
Following the literature (e.g., Knyazeva et al., 2013; Bouwman, 2013), I define
a firm’s local area as the area within a 60-mile radius of the firm’s headquarters. I
consider 100-mile and 250-mile radii as alternative cutoff values. I calculate local
hiring bias as the difference between the realized local hiring percentage (NL/N)
2Compustat reports the current headquarters location of firms. Knyazeva et al. (2013) show
that the overwhelming majority of firms do not relocate. Even for firms that relocate, most of them
remain within 60 miles of their previous location. I also implicitly assume that all executives holding
senior positions work at firm’s headquarters.
3The Vincenty formula is often used in measuring distances in the finance literature (see, for
example, Pool et al., 2015). It calculates the distance between two points on the surface of a spheroid.
The distance in miles between two zip code areas with latitude/longitude (ϕi, λi) is calculated as
3963.19× arctan(
√
(cosϕ2sin(λ2 − λ1))2 + (cosϕ1sinϕ2 − sinϕ1cosϕ2cos(λ2 − λ1))2
sinϕ1sinϕ2 + cosϕ1cosϕ2cos(λ2 − λ1) )
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and the expected local hiring percentage under the null hypothesis of a nationwide
executive market (
∑N
i=1 pi/N), where N is the total number of hiring events in my
sample, NL is the number of actual local hirings, and pi is the probability of hiring a
local executive for hiring event i under the null hypothesis.
To calculate local hiring bias, I propose several methods to estimate pi. The first
and the most straightforward measure (p1i) is the number of local firms of event firm
i divided by the number of firms nationwide. 4 However, this simple ratio measure
does not take into account that large firms provide more executives to local labor
market than small firms. Thus, in the second measure (p2i) I adjust each firm count,
in both the numerator and the denominator, with the firm’s employment size.
One concern with local hiring bias calculated using either of the above two mea-
sures of pi is that the bias might actually be driven by a firm’s tendency to hire
industry insiders rather than locals. 5 Consider Google in Silicon Valley as an exam-
ple. Suppose, at the extreme, that Google only hires executives from its own industry.
Since many of the high-technology firms in the U.S. are located in Silicon Valley, one
would observe a high realized percentage of local hiring for Google. To separate the
industry bias from the local bias, I calculate a third measure (p3i) using the number
of local firms within the same industry as the event firm divided by the total number
of firms in that industry nationwide, where industry is classified based on two-digit
SIC codes. Under this measure, if Google tends to hire only industry insiders (who
happen to be local) but not nonindustry locals, the expected local hiring percentage
p3i will account for the industry clustering effect and the local hiring bias will be zero.
Finally, the fourth measure (p4i) adjusts the third measure by firm employment size
as done for the second measure. To the extent that firms hire executives both within
4Throughout the paper, the number of firms is calculated based on firms in the Compustat
universe.
5Based on my sample, 48.3% of job changes are within the same two-digit SIC industry.
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and outside of the industry, the local hiring bias estimated using pi from the first two
(cross-industry) and last two (within-industry) measures could be regarded as upper
and lower bounds of the true bias.
Table 2.1 presents the results on the local hiring bias. Column (1) and column
(2) list the total number of hiring events N and the number of realized local hirings
NL, respectively. Column (3) shows the realized local hiring percentage, which is
calculated as column (2) divided by column (1). Columns (4) and (5) show the total
number of expected local hiring and the expected local hiring percentage under the
null hypothesis of a nationwide market. Finally, column (6) calculates the local hiring
bias as the difference between column (3) and column (5).
In Panel A, I calculate the local hiring bias using the size and industry unadjusted
measure, p1i. As shown in the first row, out of 19,692 job hirings, 34% are within
the local market (moving distance less than 60 miles). However, if the executive la-
bor market were nationally integrated, the expected local hiring percentage would be
around 5%. The difference between the realized and the expected local hiring per-
centages yields a local hiring bias of 29 percentage points. In other words, firms hire
local executives seven times more often than they would if the market were nationally
integrated. In the next two rows, I use 100-mile and 250-mile as alternative cutoffs to
define a local area. The magnitude of the local hiring bias remains substantial and is
around 29 to 31 percentage points. One thing worth noticing is that for hirings with
distance between 60-100 and 100-250 miles, the number of actual hirings are close
to the numbers of expected hirings. It suggests that the local hiring bias is mostly
driven by the hirings within 60 miles of the firm’s headquarters. This could further
imply that the 60-mile cutoff might be a reasonable one for defining local. In Panel
B, I replace the unadjusted expected local hiring measure p1i with the size-adjusted
12
measure p2i. As shown in the last column, the bias continues to exist and becomes
even larger.
To address the concern that the local hiring bias is driven by industry clustering,
I use the third and fourth measures of pi in Panels C and D. Consistent with the
fact that firms within the same industry often cluster geographically, the numbers of
expected local hirings in Panels C and D are almost twice as large as the numbers in
Panels A and B. The local hiring bias, however, is still substantially larger than zero
in all rows in Panels C and D.
In addition to the economic magnitude, I also compute statistical significance using
a two-sided binomial test where a local hiring is considered as a success. Formally,
for the binomial test, the number of trials is N , the number of successes is NL, and
the probability of success is the average of pi (
∑N
i=1 pi/N). The test results reject
the null hypothesis that the executive labor market is nationally integrated for all
distance and pi measures at the 1% level. Overall, the results in Table 2.1 provide
clear evidence on geographic segmentation in U.S. executive labor markets. The local
(60-mile) hiring bias is between 25 to 31 percentage points, and firms are four to ten
times more likely to hire locally than expected if market were integrated.
There are two things worth noting about the local hiring bias. First, I obtain
almost same results if I calculate executives’ local moving bias instead of firms’ local
hiring bias. The average actual local moving probability is four to ten times higher
than the average expected local moving probability, where the expected probability
is calculated as the (size/industry adjusted) number of local firms of an executive’s
old employer divided by the (size/industry adjusted) number of firms nationwide.
Second, in Appendix B, I conduct a set of subsample analyses and explore potential
reasons for the geographic segmentation. I find evidence that the segmentation is
caused both by firms’ and executives’ geographic preferences. Yet, the paper’s main
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analyses on how local market density affects executives’ labor market incentives do
not depend on what is the driving force of the segmentation. It only requires that
firms know that they are likely to end up with hiring local executives, and executives
know that they are likely to end up with moving to local firms.
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Table 2.1: Local Hiring Bias
Notes: The table presents the results on local hiring bias based on a sample of 19,692 executive
job changes between the U.S. public firms covered by the BoardEx database. Column (1) reports
the total number of hirings. Column (2) reports the number of realized local hirings. A hiring is
considered as local if the distance between the headquarters of executive’s new and old firms is less
than 60 (100/250) miles. Column (3) shows the realized local hiring percentage, which is calculated
as column (2) divided by column (1). Column (4) shows the number of expected local hirings based
on the null hypothesis that the U.S. executive market is nationwide. Column (5) shows the expected
local hiring percentage, which is calculated as column (4) divided by column (1). Column (6) shows
the local hiring bias, which is calculated as column (3) minus column (5). Panel A shows the results
with p1i as the measure of expected local hiring probability. p1i is calculated as the number of local
firms of the event firm i divided by the number of firms nationwide. Panel B uses p2i as the measure,
which adjusts each firm count in p1i by firm employment size. Panel C uses p3i as the measure,
which is calculated as the number of local firms within the same two-digit SIC industry as the event
firm divided by the number of firms of that industry nationwide. Panel D uses p4i as the measure,
which adjusts each firm count in p3i by firm employment size. A two-sided binomial test is used to
test the null hypothesis that the U.S. executive market is nationwide. The null hypothesis is rejected
in each row of the table at the 1% level. For brevity, significance indicators are omitted.
Hiring # Local # Local % Exp # Exp % Bias (pp)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: p1i (size unadjusted,
industry unadjusted)
60 miles 19692 6713 34.1 1053 5.3 28.7
100 miles 19692 7123 36.2 1344 6.8 29.3
250 miles 19692 8664 44.0 2628 13.3 30.7
Panel B: p2i (size adjusted,
industry unadjusted)
60 miles 19692 6713 34.1 668 3.4 30.7
100 miles 19692 7123 36.2 860 4.4 31.8
250 miles 19692 8664 44.0 1762 8.9 35.0
Panel C: p3i (size unadjusted,
industry adjusted)
60 miles 19692 6713 34.1 1884 9.6 24.5
100 miles 19692 7123 36.2 2260 11.5 24.7
250 miles 19692 8664 44.0 4030 20.5 23.5
Panel D: p4i (size adjusted,
industry adjusted)
60 miles 19692 6713 34.1 1780 9.0 25.1
100 miles 19692 7123 36.2 2055 10.4 25.7
250 miles 19692 8664 44.0 3648 18.5 25.5
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Chapter 3
LOCAL MARKET DENSITY AND MANAGERIAL INCENTIVE ALIGNMENT
If firms often hire locally and executives often move locally, then the density of local
labor market could affect executives’ non-compensation incentives. In this section, I
focus on three sources of (dis)incentives: dismissal threat, outside tournament incen-
tives, and new employment after dismissal.
3.1 Summary Statistics for Sample Firms
The analyses of managerial incentives in the following sections are based on a
sample consisting of firms with available Execucomp, Compustat, Center for Research
in Security Prices (CRSP) and Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) data from 1996
to 2013. I use the Execucomp database to identify CEO turnovers, and for information
on executive characteristics including age, compensation, tenure, etc. All firm level
accounting data come from Compustat and all stock data come from CRSP. I also use
the ISS database for information on board characteristics and corporate governance.
The key explanatory variable is the density of executive labor market in a firm’s
vicinity. Since local hiring bias is most substantial in the 60-mile area around hiring
firm’s headquarters (Table 2.1), I use 60-mile as the cutoff to define local area. I use
two main measures of local executive market density. Local market density 1 is the
total number of firms within a 60-mile radius of the sample firm. Local market density
2 adjusts each firm count in the local area with firm’s employment size. Knyazeva
et al. (2013) use similar measures to characterize the availability of prospective direc-
tors near a firm. In robustness checks in Chapter 6.1, I consider two other measures
of density assuming that firms only hire industry insiders.
16
The summary statistics of the main variables are presented in Table 3.1. The
sample contains 28,603 firm-year observations and 2,789 unique firms. On average,
a local executive market consists of executives from 371 local firms. To address the
skewness of the density measures and to mitigate the effect of extreme values on
regression results, I measure density in logarithm in all regressions. Panel A also
reports other common characteristics of sample firms. Firms on average have total
assets of $6.06 billion and annual sales of $3.32 billion. All dollar values are stated in
2000 U.S. dollars deflated or inflated by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The mean
annual stock return, sales growth and return on assets (ROA) are 19%, 14% and
12%, respectively. Executive characteristics are shown in Panel B. A typical CEO is
at the age of 56, has been at the helm for five years, and owns 3% of firm’s stock.
When the top management team is considered, the average age drops to 51 and the
average stock ownership drops to 1%. Table A.1 in the Appendix A gives a detailed
description of variables used in the paper.
3.2 Performance-Based Dismissal Threat
Since firms usually hire executives locally rather than nationally, firms in denser
labor markets should have more outside candidates to choose from. As shown in
Parrino (1997), convenient access to outside candidates encourages a firm to replace
its incumbent executives with outsiders when an executive’s performance turns out
to be low.
3.2.1 Turnover-Performance Sensitivity
To show that market density raises dismissal threat for local executives, I use
forced CEO turnovers and investigate turnover-performance sensitivity.
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For all CEO turnovers in the Execucomp database, I search news reports on
Factiva and classify a turnover as forced (e.g. Parrino, 1997) if (i) the report says
that the CEO is fired, forced out, or departs due to policy differences; or (ii) the
departing CEO is under age of 60, does not announce the retirement at least six
months in advance, and does not leave for health reasons or acceptance of another
position. Following the literature on CEO turnover, I use industry-adjusted stock
return as the performance measure. To capture other causes of CEO departures, I
control for CEO age, CEO duality, CEO tenure, CEO ownership, board size, board
independence, E-index, firm size, and firm age. I use logit models for all regressions,
include industry and year fixed effects, and report coefficients with robust standard
errors clustered at firm level.
Table 3.2 shows the results. The dependent variable in columns (1) to (3) is a
CEO turnover dummy, which is set to one if the CEO is replaced in the subsequent
year. In column (1), I look at turnover-performance sensitivity without interacting
performance and density. Since a firm is more likely to replace its CEO when its
performance declines but might keep the CEO as long as the performance meets
some threshold, I decompose performance into a positive performance variable and
a negative performance variable to examine the asymmetry in turnover-performance
sensitivity. 1 The negative performance variable is equal to the industry-adjusted
return, if the industry-adjusted return is negative, and zero otherwise. The positive
performance variable is defined accordingly. Consistent with previous studies, the
results in column (1) show that performance is negatively related to the probability
of CEO turnovers for firms with below-industry performance, while this negative
relation is not significant for firms with above-industry performance.
1Jenter and Lewellen (2014) empirically show that the effects of performance on turnover is
nonlinear. Also see Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Adams and Ferreira (2007).
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Columns (2) to (3) test my hypothesis that turnover-performance sensitivity in-
creases with local executive market density. In column (2), I use Local market density
1 as the density measure and interact it with both negative and positive performance.
As there is no significant relation between performance and CEO turnover for firms
with return above industry median, the coefficient on the interaction term between
density and positive performance is not different from zero. On the other hand, the
coefficient on the interaction between density and negative performance is signifi-
cantly negative. 2 Following Ai and Norton (2003) and Norton et al. (2004), I find
that the average interaction effect is -0.005 with a z-statistic of -2.29, which is signif-
icant at the 5% level. 3 Therefore, for firms with below-industry performance, CEO
turnover-performance sensitivity rises as the density of local executive market rises.
This result is consistent with my hypothesis that firms located in denser markets have
more convenient access to outside candidates and thus dismiss poor performing CEOs
more frequently. In terms of economic magnitude, a 20 percentage point decrease in
annual stock return from industry median increases the probability of a CEO turnover
by 92% for firms with top-quartile density but by only 69% for firms with bottom-
quartile density. In addition to its effect on turnover-performance sensitivity, market
density also affects the probability of turnover directly. The positive coefficient on
density itself plus the negative coefficient on the interaction between negative perfor-
mance and density imply that firms in denser labor markets have higher CEO forced
turnover rate. In column (3), I use Local market density 2 as an alternative density
measure and find statistically and economically similar results.
2Similar results are obtained if I split the sample into firms with positive performance and firms
with negative performance and estimate the coefficients separately.
3I also estimate the effect of market density on turnover-performance sensitivity using a linear
probability model. The coefficient on the interaction term is -0.006 and is statistically significant at
the 5% level.
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Overall, the results in Table 3.2 show that an increase in local labor market density
is associated with a significant increase in CEO’s turnover-performance sensitivity.
This performance-induced dismissal threat could be an important source of incentives
for CEOs and presumably all top executives.
3.2.2 Outside Succession
If market density encourages firms to replace poor performing executives by pro-
viding local outside candidates, outside succession should be more frequently observed
in denser markets. Therefore, I next investigate the relation between market density
and outside succession rate as further evidence on the dismissal threat argument.
I use both CEO and non-CEO hirings covered in the Execucomp database. I
record a CEO hiring if there is a change in a firm’s CEO position and record a non-
CEO hiring if an executive appears in a firm’s annual proxy for the first time. An
executive is classified as an outsider if she has been with the firm for less than one
year before taking her CEO or non-CEO position. 4 For CEO hirings, I control for
whether the departure of former CEO is forced, since successor choice is strongly
related to the reason of turnover (Parrino, 1997). Among 2,456 departing CEOs with
available data, 31% are succeeded by outsiders. For 14,943 non-CEO observations,
25% are outside hirings.
Table 3.3 column (1) shows the relation between local labor market density and
outside CEO succession probability based on a logit model, where the dependent
variable is an outside succession indicator. The coefficient of Local market density
1 is positive and significant at the 1% level. An interquartile increase in market
4For CEOs, I search news articles to collect the start date of being CEO and the date of joining
the company. For non-CEO executives, I assume the start date of taking the position as the start
date of the fiscal year when the executive is first reported in the firm’s annual proxy and use the
joining date from Execucomp. Non-CEO executives with missing joining date are coded as insiders.
Observations in the year when a firm first appears in Execucomp are excluded.
20
density raises the probability of firm choosing an outside CEO by about 5.1 percentage
points, which is a 17% increase compared to the average outsider rate. In line with
the findings from previous studies, forced turnovers are often associated with outside
successions. Column (2) shows similar results using Local market density 2 as an
alternative density measure. In columns (3) and (4), I use the sample of non-CEO
hirings. The coefficient of market density is still significantly positive, though the
marginal effect slightly decreases. These results reinforce the argument behind Table
3.2 that executives in denser markets face stronger dismissal threat because firms
have more convenient access to outside replacements. 5
3.3 Outside Tournament Incentives
In addition to internal dismissal threat, external tournament incentive is another
source of non-compensation incentives. In this section, I consider two parts of the
tournament incentives, the size of tournament prize and the likelihood of tournaments,
and examine how local market density affects both of them. 6
3.3.1 Tournament Prize
The compensation gap between an executive’s old job and the potential new job
is usually considered as the prize of a tournament. To the extent that there are
more large firms in denser markets and firms size distribution is more skewed to the
5One might be concerned that the high probability of hiring outsiders for firms in denser markets
could reduce incentives of internal promotion for executives. Yet, for CEOs, since they do not
have internal promotion incentives at all, they should not be affected. For non-CEOs, although the
probability of being promoted as an insider in any given turnover event is lower in denser markets
(Table 3.3), the frequency of turnover is higher (Table 3.2).
6Consider a simple model where n risk neutral executives compete for v (v < n) job vacancies.
Executives choose discretely whether to exert efforts or not, with the cost of effort being d. Jobs
are randomly assigned to executives who choose to exert effort. The compensation increase is g
for those executives who obtain the new job. In a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, the
probability of an executive exerting effort is p = g · vn · 1d , where g represents the tournament prize
and vn represents the tournament likelihood.
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right, I expect market density to be positively correlated with the size of local pay
gap. Empirically, I measure each firm’s pay gap as the the difference between its
compensation and the compensation of the local 90th percentile firm, where firm
compensation is measured as either the mean compensation of its top five earners,
or CEO compensation, or mean compensation of non-CEO top executives. For firms
with compensation level higher than the local 90th percentile, compensation gap is
coded as zero. I use the local 90th percentile rather than the local top to alleviate the
impact of outlier compensation caused by unusual and transitory events. I use total
compensation (TDC1) and cash compensation (salary plus bonus) as two compensa-
tion measures. 7 Cash compensation can be viewed as a more conservative measure,
since total compensation is mainly comprised of stocks and options that might not be
received by the new executive winning the tournament. Logarithm of compensation
gap is used in regressions, so the results reflect the compensation increase relative to
current compensation level.
Table 3.4 presents the regression results of local compensation gap on local market
density. To control for factors that affect a firm’s compensation level and thus the
pay gap, I add a set of firm and executive characteristics as control variables in
regressions. Column (1) uses mean total compensation of top five earners in the
calculation of pay gap. The coefficient of market density is significantly positive at
the 1% level, indicating that compensation gap is larger in denser markets. The
coefficients of control variables also show the expected signs. For instance, since
firm’s stock performance and size are positively related to firm’s own compensation
level, they are negatively related to pay gap. In column (2), the coefficient of density
remains significantly positive when I use salary plus bonus as a more conservative
7The empirical results remain quantitatively similar if I use estimated total compensation based
on method in Coles et al. (2014) to accommodate the changes in compensation data reporting in
Execucomp after fiscal year 2005 due to the passage of FAS 123R.
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measure of compensation. As for magnitude, local compensation gap goes down
by almost two-thirds when there is an interquartile decrease in market density, all
else being equal. In columns (3) and (4), compensation gaps are calculated using
CEO total compensation and mean non-CEO total compensation, respectively. The
coefficients of local market density are still significantly positive and are in similar
magnitude as the coefficient in column (1). Finally, in columns (5) and (6), I replicate
the results in columns (1) and (2) using Local market density 2 as an alternative
measure of market density. The results remain almost unchanged.
The results in Table 3.4 should be viewed as the effects of market density on
expected compensation increase, because executives might not move to the local 90th
percentile firm in a tournament. Therefore, I also examine how realized compensation
increase varies with market density. Based on an Execucomp sample (described in
the next subsection) where local job promotions are observed and compensation data
are available, I find that the mean realized compensation increase is $1.72 million for
executives in markets with top-quartile density, but only $0.57 million for executives
in markets with bottom-quartile density. This confirms the findings in Table 3.4 that
tournament prize is larger in denser markets.
3.3.2 Tournament Likelihood
The strength of tournament incentives depends not only on the size of the tour-
nament prize but also on the likelihood of tournaments. Kale et al. (2009) and Coles
et al. (2013) both find empirical evidence that the incentive from tournament prize is
stronger when the likelihood of tournament is higher. In this subsection, I examine
how tournament likelihood varies with local market density.
Executives in denser labor markets should have more local outside opportunities
because there are more local firms, and each firm has higher frequency of replacing
23
its incumbent executive with an outsider (as shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3). On the
flip side, these executives also face more competition from their local peers. To em-
pirically test the relation between market density and outside tournament likelihood,
I use realized executive job changes covered by the Execucomp database. For each
firm-year in Execucomp, I count the number of local tournaments won by executives
of that firm in that year. 8 I record a local tournament if (i) an executive’s employer
(in Execucomp) in year t is different from her employer (in Execucomp) in year t+ 1,
(ii) the moving distance is less than 60 miles, and (iii) the new job’s compensation
(TDC1 deflated by CPI) is higher than the old one’s. For a small sample of observa-
tions in which executive compensation is not available, I compare total assets of the
new firm and total assets of the old firm since firm size is highly correlated with ex-
ecutive compensation (Murphy (1999)). 9 I obtain 1177 tournaments for the analysis
sample and 385 are local, which yields an average of 0.016 local tournaments in each
firm year. The low realized local promotion probability does not necessarily mean
that the local tournament incentives are small. As argued in Coles et al. (2013),
executives with external opportunities can put pressure on their current firms and
require compensation increase, so they can extract benefits of external opportunities
without switching firms.
Regression results are presented in Table 3.5. The dependent variable is the
number of local promotions in each firm-year observation. In columns (1) and (2),
I find that the coefficients of Local market density 1 and Local market density 2
are significantly positive, indicating that there are more local tournaments in denser
labor markets. Based on column (1), an interquartile increase in density raises the
8I only consider top-five executives to deal with the concern that the number of tournaments is
affected by the number of executives reported in annual proxies.
9The empirical results do not change if I include as tournament cases in which a non-CEO
executive becomes a CEO in the new firm but does not experience a compensation increase. These
cases account for less than 2% of job changes.
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number of local outside tournaments by 0.011. As the sample unconditional mean is
0.016, executives in the market of top quartile density have an almost doubled outside
tournament likelihood than executives in the market of bottom quartile density. A
more accurate way to measure tournament likelihood as part of tournament incentive
is promotion-performance sensitivity, rather than the number of promotions. Yet,
compared to turnover-performance relation, promotion-performance relation is more
noisy in the data and requires a longer window for performance measure (Fee and
Hadlock (2003)). In column (3), I use three-year cumulative return as performance
measure and find a marginally significant positive relation between local promotion
and performance. In column (4), I interact local market density with performance
and find a positive coefficient of the interaction term, significant at the 10% level.
Overall, the results in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 suggest that market density is positively
associated with both local tournament prize and local tournament likelihood, and
hence local tournament incentive.
3.4 Subsequent Employment after Dismissal
So far, the results through Table 3.2 to Table 3.5 show that market density creates
non-compensation incentives for executives through two channels: performance-based
dismissal threat and outside tournament incentives. In this section, I examine whether
market density could also reduce incentives by offering executives more backup options
in the event of dismissal. To empirically test this disincentive channel, I examine
subsequent employment outcomes of executives losing their jobs.
3.4.1 Sample Construction
I construct a sample of dismissed executives with a procedure closely following
Fee and Hadlock (2004). I start the sample with executives under the age of 55, who
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are listed in an S&P 500 firm’s proxy statement in one fiscal year but not in that
firm’s or any other Execucomp firms’ statements in the subsequent year (i.e., “leav-
ing” the firm). I restrict the sample to S&P 500 firms because the press coverage is
more comprehensive on these firms than on others. I also restrict the sample period
to 2000-2010 for the same practical reason. I exclude executives “leaving” their firms
at the age beyond 55 because these “leavings” are likely to be driven by retirement.
This procedure yields an initial sample consisting of 1,358 “leaving” executives. For
each of these executives, I search on Factiva for news articles that contain both the
executive’s name and the prior employer’s name, and collect information on the exec-
utive’s departure and employments in the following three years. 10 Among the 1,358
cases, I exclude 288 cases in which news articles show that these executives actually
remain in the firm even though they are no longer listed in the proxy statement. I
also exclude all cases in which the executive leaves the employer due to health reasons
(seven cases), death (five), acceptance of a new position (113), or asset spinoffs (12).
The remaining cases form the dismissed executive sample. There are 336 cases in
which no news is found on either the executive’s departure from the old employer
or on the executive joining a new employer. For cases (597) in which some news re-
garding the executive’s employment history is reported, I define the executive’s new
employer to be the firm where the individual is hired as a full-time executive for the
first time after leaving her prior employer. I also measure the unemployment duration
of an executive who has changed job using the date of departure from her old job
and the date of start at her new job, as reported in news articles. 11 Finally, I assign
10As noted in Fee and Hadlock (2004), it is not practical to search news articles just using the
executive’s name without the employer’s name. Also, by comparing the results from news searching
and the results from annual Compact Disclosure Compact D database, the authors find that their
news searching procedure is sufficient to determine the executive’s employment history.
11For a small number of cases in which there is news on an executive’s joining the new firm but
no news on her leaving the old firm, I assume that the executive leaves the firm at the end of the
last fiscal year where she appears in the firm’s annual proxy.
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each executive’s reason of departure into forced departure, pursing other interests,
retirement, or resignation, based on the definition in Fee and Hadlock (2004). 12
For my sample of dismissed executives, the rate of new employment in the sub-
sequent three years is 32%. This number is close to the findings in Fee and Hadlock
(2004), where they document that 26.8% (38.9%) of executives under the age of 60
(50) find new employment. This low rate indicates that in general leaving a firm
involuntarily is a downturn in an executive’s career. To provide further information
on the subsequent employment outcome of a departing executive, I also assess the
quality of the new position. Since it is difficult to obtain data on executive’s com-
pensation, I use firm’s size as a proxy for the job’s quality. Among all new firms that
executives join, only two-thirds (63.3%) are publicly traded firms. Moreover, for new
firms with data on total assets available, the median ratio of new firm size to old
firm size is merely 0.14. Overall, the low new employment rate and the decline in job
quality suggest that most of the leavings covered in the sample are career downturns
for executives and could be regarded as dismissals, which suits my goal of studying
whether market density provides backup options for dismissed executives.
3.4.2 Empirical Results
Table 3.6 provides the regression results on whether local market density helps
dismissed executives find new jobs. I include the reasons for departure as controls
with resignation being the omitted group. I also include a dummy stating whether
the executive holds a CEO position previously, the executive’s previous compensation
12A departure is classified as forced if the article reporting the turnover uses words such as “oust”,
“fired”, “terminated” or overtly links the turnover with poor performance or scandal, or if the
leaving executive is paid with severance. A departure is classified as pursuing other interests if news
report says the executive leaves “to pursue other interests”. A departure is classified as retirement
if news report says the executive decides to retire from the firm. All other departures are classified
as resignation. There are 89 cases of forced departure, 98 cases of pursuing other interests, 176 cases
of retirement, and 234 cases of resignation.
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level, and some characteristics of her previous employer. Column (1) shows the result
for the sample including cases in which no news report on departure or hiring is found.
The dependent variable is a new employment dummy, which equals one if a dismissed
executive finds a new job within three years and zero otherwise. The coefficient
of Local market density 1 is slightly negative but not significant at any conventional
level, indicating that dismissed executives in denser markets do not find new jobs more
easily. In columns (2) and (3), I exclude cases in which no news is found and use
Local market density 1 and Local market density 2 as different measures of density.
The results resemble the finding in column (1). Columns (4) and (5) address the
concern that although market density does not increase the probability of obtaining
a new job, it might affect the quality of the new position. The dependent variable
in column (4) is a public firm dummy which equals one only if the new position that
an executive obtains is in a public firm. In column (5), I scale each new position
in public firms with its quality, calculated as the ratio of new firm size to old firm
size, and estimate the effect of market density with a tobit model. The coefficients in
both columns (4) and (5) are insignificant, indicating dismissed executives in denser
market do not find higher quality new jobs. Finally, column (6) examines whether
the length of unemployment varies with market density. The tobit result suggests
that it takes even more time for an executive in denser markets to find a new job
after being dismissed from the previous firm. In sum, Table 3.6 provides empirical
evidence against the concern that local market density disincentivizes executives by
offering more backup options.
One explanation for the “non-effect” result is that dismissed executives often have
to leave their local markets in order to find a new job, probably because executive
reputation spreads locally. If this argument is true, a dismissed executive will be
less likely to find the next job in her local market as compared to an executive who
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changes job voluntarily. The empirical evidence in Table 3.7 supports this argument.
For dismissed executives who have found new jobs in the three-year window, I obtain
location of the new employer from Compustat, and compute the moving distance
from the old to the new employer. 13 This procedure yields 105 observations with
available data on moving distance. Following the method in Chapter 2, I use the
four measures of expected local hiring probability and the three distance cutoffs. As
shown in Panel A, among the 105 new jobs obtained by dismissed executives, only
21 new jobs are located within 60 miles of the old job. Although this 20% (21/105)
realized local hiring percentage is still significantly above the expected percentage
under a nationwide market hypothesis, the local hiring bias (14.9 percentage points,
with p1i used) is only about half of the magnitude compared to the bias documented
in the non-dismissed sample in Chapter 2 (19,692 job changes covered by BoardEx).
To the extant that the dismissed sample might contain some voluntary job changes
and the non-dismissed sample might contain some involuntary job changes, the true
difference in local hiring probability between dismissed and non-dismissed executives
would be even larger.
To provide statistical significance, I conduct a two-sample t-test in Panel B. The
local hiring bias in the dismissed sample is lower than the bias in the non-dismissed
sample for all expected local hiring probability measures and distance cutoffs. The
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level for all rows except the last one
which is significant at the 10% level. In unreported results, I also consider the sample
consisting of forced executive turnovers only. If the executive reputation argument is
true, the probability of obtaining a new job locally should be even lower for executives
who lose their previous jobs with a public announcement of being fired. Of all 14
13I only consider new employers covered by Compustat here, because in Panel B of Table 3.7, I
compare the local hiring bias between the dismissed sample and the non-dismissed sample studied
in Chapter 2. The non-dismissed sample includes only job moves between Compustat firms.
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forced turnovers, only two executives found a new job locally (60-mile). This 14%
(2/14) local percentage is lower than the 20% (21/105) where the full dismissed sample
is considered, although the difference is not statistically significant due to the small
number of observations.
In sum, the results in Tables 3.6 and 3.7 suggest that local labor market density
does not help dismissed executives find a new job more easily because dismissed
executives often have to leave their local markets after dismissals.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Notes: The table reports the summary statistics for a sample of Execucomp/Compustat/CRSP/ISS
firms with available data from 1996 to 2013. Local market density 1 is the total number of firms
within 60 miles of the firm’s headquarters. Local market density 2 is the total number of firms, each
scaled by employment size, within 60 miles of the firm’s headquarters. Market-to-book ratio is the
ratio of market value of assets to book value of assets. Stock return is calculated as the cumulative
return 12 months before the current fiscal year end. ROA is the ratio of operating income to book
value of assets. Average age, average tenure, average ownership are the average characteristics of
executives covered by Execucomp for each firm-year observation. Local pay gap (TDC1) is the 90th
percentile of local (60 miles) firm compensation minus the sample firm compensation and zero if the
difference is negative, where firm compensation is calculated as the mean total compensation (Top5,
TDC1) of top-five earners. All dollar values are stated in 2000 dollars deflated or inflated by the
Consumer Price Index. See Table A.1 for definition of variables. All variables are winsorized at the
1st and 99th percentile levels.
Mean Median Std. Dev P25 P75
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Firm characteristics
Local market density 1 (number) 371.08 273.00 375.78 69.00 534.00
Local market density 1 (logarithm) 5.20 5.61 1.44 4.25 6.28
Local market density 2 (number) 255.02 165.16 272.98 60.56 331.83
Local market density 2 (logarithm) 4.81 5.11 1.50 4.12 5.81
Total assets, $ B 2000 6.06 1.49 11.08 0.50 5.25
Sales, $ B 2000 3.32 1.07 5.30 0.40 3.33
Market value, $ B 2000 4.11 1.31 6.50 0.51 4.03
Market-to-book ratio 1.97 1.45 2.10 1.10 2.14
Stock return 0.19 0.11 0.70 -0.13 0.37
Sale growth 0.14 0.08 0.84 -0.01 0.19
ROA 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.18
Firm age 25.17 20.00 16.62 11.00 39.00
R&D intensity (%) 3.32 0.00 7.46 0.00 3.34
Board size 9.28 9.00 2.75 7.00 11.00
Board independence 0.69 0.71 0.17 0.60 0.83
E-Index 2.30 2.00 1.34 1.00 3.00
Panel B: Executive characteristics
CEO age 55.67 56.00 7.48 51.00 60.00
CEO tenure 5.01 4.00 3.59 2.00 7.00
CEO ownership (%) 3.29 0.90 7.22 0.27 2.71
CEO chairman (%) 40.46
Forced CEO turnover (%) 2.50
Average executive age 50.82 51.00 5.03 47.60 54.00
Average executive tenure 4.80 4.40 2.28 3.25 6.00
Average executive ownership (%) 0.85 0.33 1.38 0.09 0.99
Local pay gap (TDC1), $ M 2000 2.79 2.56 2.31 1.04 3.94
Local pay gap (TDC1), logarithm 6.78 7.97 2.92 7.07 8.41
Observations 28603
Unique firms 2789
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Table 3.2: Local Market Density and CEO Turnover-Performance Sensitivity
Notes: The table reports the coefficients from logit models of CEO turnover-performance sensitivity
on local market density. The sample consists of firms with available data from 1996 to 2013. The
dependent variable is a forced CEO turnover dummy, which equals one if CEO is forced to leave the
firm in the next year and zero otherwise. Following Parrino (1997), a turnover is classified as forced
if (i) the report says that the CEO is fired, forced out, or departs due to policy differences; or (ii) the
departing CEO is under age of 60, does not announce the retirement at least six months in advance,
and does not leave for health reasons or acceptance of another position. Performance is measured
as the cumulative stock return 12 months before current fiscal year end minus the contemporaneous
median industry return (two-digit SIC). Negative performance is equal to the industry-adjusted
return if the industry-adjusted return is negative and zero otherwise. Positive performance is defined
accordingly. Local market density 1 is the logarithm of one plus total number of firms within 60
miles of the firm’s headquarters. Local market density 2 is the logarithm of one plus total number
of firms, each scaled by employment size, within 60 miles of the firm’s headquarters. Industry
return is the median of industry stock returns. All CEO characteristics refer to the outgoing CEO.
See Appendix for definition of other variables. Industry (two-digit SIC) and year fixed effects are
included in all specifications. Standard errors reported in the parentheses are robust and clustered
by firm. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Forced turnover
(1) (2) (3)
Negative performance -3.0719∗∗∗ -1.7001∗∗ -1.6276∗∗
(0.2283) (0.7274) (0.7271)
Positive performance -0.4189 -0.3863 -0.3969
(0.2835) (0.9009) (0.8631)
Local market density 1 0.1283∗∗∗
(0.0330)
Negative performance × Local market density 1 -0.2454∗∗
(0.1218)
Positive performance × Local market density 1 -0.0091
(0.1648)
Local market density 2 0.1386∗∗∗
(0.0349)
Negative performance × Local market density 2 -0.2619∗∗
(0.1232)
Positive performance × Local market density 2 -0.0072
(0.1613)
Industry return -1.4098∗∗∗ -1.4093∗∗∗ -1.4138∗∗∗
(0.3065) (0.3140) (0.3143)
Firm size 0.0284 0.0058 0.0057
(0.0392) (0.0375) (0.0375)
Firm age 0.0023 0.0037 0.0036
(0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0032)
CEO age -0.0286∗∗∗ -0.0294∗∗∗ -0.0295∗∗∗
(0.0070) (0.0069) (0.0069)
CEO chairman -0.3815∗∗∗ -0.3910∗∗∗ -0.3937∗∗∗
(0.1019) (0.1025) (0.1025)
CEO tenure -0.0122 -0.0094 -0.0091
(0.0145) (0.0146) (0.0146)
CEO ownership -0.0834∗∗∗ -0.0821∗∗∗ -0.0825∗∗∗
(0.0245) (0.0244) (0.0245)
Board size -0.0571∗∗ -0.0508∗∗ -0.0517∗∗
(0.0229) (0.0222) (0.0222)
Board independence 0.0161 0.0708 0.0794
(0.2912) (0.2962) (0.2955)
E-Index -0.0310 -0.0136 -0.0139
(0.0373) (0.0374) (0.0374)
Observations 21,756 21,756 21,756
Pseudo R2 0.084 0.093 0.093
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Table 3.3: Local Market Density and Outside Succession
Notes: The table reports the coefficients from logit models of executive outside succession on local
market density. The sample consists of firms with available data from 1996 to 2013. The dependent
variable in columns (1) and (2) is an outside CEO dummy, which equals one if the incoming CEO
has been with the firm for less than one year before being the CEO. The dependent variable in
columns (3) and (4) is an outside executive dummy, which equals one if the non-CEO executive has
been with the firm for less than one year before the first time listed on the firm’s annual proxy.
Local market density 1 is the logarithm of one plus total number of firms within 60 miles of the
firm’s headquarters. Local market density 2 is the logarithm of one plus total number of firms, each
scaled by employment size, within 60 miles of the firm’s headquarters. Forced turnover is a dummy
variable which equals one if the outgoing CEO is forced out. All CEO characteristics refer to the
outgoing CEO. See Appendix for definition of other variables. Industry (two-digit SIC) and year
fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors reported in the parentheses are robust
and clustered by firm. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Outside Succession
CEO Non-CEO
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Local market density 1 0.1248∗∗∗ 0.0915∗∗∗
(0.0367) (0.0219)
Local market density 2 0.0876∗∗∗ 0.0472∗∗
(0.0331) (0.0207)
Forced turnover 0.5235∗∗∗ 0.5326∗∗∗
(0.1206) (0.1206)
CEO age -0.0127∗ -0.0127∗
(0.0067) (0.0067)
CEO tenure -0.0668∗∗∗ -0.0674∗∗∗
(0.0161) (0.0161)
CEO ownership -0.0028 -0.0032
(0.0107) (0.0108)
Industry adjusted return -0.5468∗∗∗ -0.5410∗∗∗ -0.0630∗∗ -0.0600∗
(0.1398) (0.1399) (0.0315) (0.0315)
Firm size -0.1593∗∗∗ -0.1543∗∗∗ -0.1639∗∗∗ -0.1605∗∗∗
(0.0375) (0.0373) (0.0231) (0.0231)
Firm age -0.0023 -0.0029 -0.0130∗∗∗ -0.0136∗∗∗
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Board size -0.0583∗∗ -0.0615∗∗∗ -0.0133 -0.0159
(0.0233) (0.0234) (0.0136) (0.0136)
Board independence 2.0029∗∗∗ 2.0004∗∗∗ 0.4640∗∗∗ 0.4736∗∗∗
(0.4070) (0.4035) (0.1759) (0.1771)
E-Index 0.0248 0.0235 0.0031 -0.0011
(0.0406) (0.0406) (0.0230) (0.0230)
Observations 2,456 2,456 14,943 14,943
Pseudo R2 0.096 0.094 0.083 0.082
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Table 3.4: Local Market Density and Executive Local Pay Gap
Notes: The table reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of executive local pay gaps
on local market density. The sample consists of firms with available data from 1996 to 2013. The
dependent variable is the logarithm of pay gap between firm compensation and the 90th percentile
of local firm compensation. For firms with compensation higher than the 90th percentile, compen-
sation gaps are coded as zeros. In columns (1) and (5), firm compensation is measured as mean
total compensation (TDC1) of firm top five earners. In columns (2) and (6), firm compensation is
measured as mean cash compensation (salary+bonus) of firm top five earners. In column (3), firm
compensation is measured as CEO total compensation. In column (4), firm compensation is mea-
sured as mean total compensation of non-CEO top earners Local market density 1 is the logarithm
of one plus total number of firms within 60 miles of the firm’s headquarters. Local market density 2
is the logarithm of one plus total number of firms, each scaled by employment size, within 60 miles
of the firm’s headquarters. See Appendix for definition of other variables. Industry (two-digit SIC)
and year fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors reported in the parentheses
are robust and clustered by firm. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
Local pay gap
Top5 Top5 CEO Non-CEO Top5 Top5
TDC1 Cash TDC1 TDC1 TDC1 Cash
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Local market density 1 0.6575∗∗∗ 0.5203∗∗∗ 0.6849∗∗∗ 0.6386∗∗∗
(0.0383) (0.0304) (0.0418) (0.0368)
Local market density 2 0.7416∗∗∗ 0.5970∗∗∗
(0.0339) (0.0266)
Industry adjusted return -0.1995∗∗∗ -0.1690∗∗∗ -0.2310∗∗∗ -0.1736∗∗∗ -0.2015∗∗∗ -0.1711∗∗∗
(0.0318) (0.0242) (0.0364) (0.0290) (0.0307) (0.0232)
Firm size -0.7725∗∗∗ -0.5512∗∗∗ -0.7550∗∗∗ -0.7294∗∗∗ -0.7837∗∗∗ -0.5612∗∗∗
(0.0337) (0.0270) (0.0354) (0.0324) (0.0330) (0.0264)
Firm age 0.0081∗∗∗ 0.0032 0.0036 0.0090∗∗∗ 0.0061∗∗ 0.0017
(0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0032) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0022)
Average age 0.0161∗∗ -0.0054 0.0144∗ 0.0172∗∗ 0.0160∗∗ -0.0054
(0.0074) (0.0067) (0.0079) (0.0071) (0.0072) (0.0064)
Average tenure 0.0428∗∗∗ -0.0084 0.0593∗∗∗ 0.0324∗∗ 0.0477∗∗∗ -0.0040
(0.0134) (0.0115) (0.0142) (0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0110)
Average ownership 0.0076 0.0009 0.0232∗ 0.0040 -0.0072 -0.0109
(0.0103) (0.0080) (0.0134) (0.0086) (0.0093) (0.0083)
Board size 0.0172 -0.0140 0.0307 -0.0046 0.0104 -0.0190
(0.0169) (0.0155) (0.0188) (0.0167) (0.0163) (0.0150)
Board independence 0.2139 0.3616∗∗ -0.0614 0.3427∗ 0.4475∗∗ 0.5505∗∗∗
(0.2016) (0.1760) (0.2129) (0.1952) (0.1924) (0.1674)
E-Index 0.0885∗∗∗ 0.0576∗∗∗ 0.0666∗∗ 0.0964∗∗∗ 0.0885∗∗∗ 0.0581∗∗∗
(0.0253) (0.0210) (0.0271) (0.0243) (0.0241) (0.0198)
Observations 25,686 25,686 25,686 25,686 25,686 25,686
Adjusted R2 0.273 0.262 0.232 0.276 0.313 0.307
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Table 3.5: Local Market Density and Executive Local Outside Tournament
Notes: The table presents the OLS regression of executive local outside tournament on local market
density. The sample consists of firms with available data from 1996 to 2013. The dependent vari-
able is the number of executive local job tournaments in each firm-year observation, where a local
tournament is identified if an executive’s employer in year t is different from her employer in year
t+ 1, the distance between new and old employer’s headquarters is less than 60 miles, and the new
job’s compensation is higher than the old one’s or the new firm is larger than the old one in terms of
total assets when compensation data is not available. Local market density 1 is the logarithm of one
plus total number of firms within 60 miles of the firm’s headquarters. Local market density 2 is the
logarithm of one plus total number of firms, each scaled by employment size, within 60 miles of the
firm’s headquarters. Positive performance (3-year) is equal to the 3-year industry-adjusted return if
the industry-adjusted return is positive and zero otherwise. Negative performance (3-year) is defined
accordingly. See Appendix for definition of other variables. Industry (two-digit SIC) and year fixed
effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors reported in the parentheses are robust and
clustered by firm. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Number of local outside tournaments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Local market density 1 0.0057∗∗∗ 0.0044∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Local market density 2 0.0048∗∗∗ 0.0036∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0007)
Positive performance (3-year) 0.0081∗ -0.0044 -0.0035
(0.0042) (0.0050) (0.0042)
Negative performance (3-year) 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0003
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Positive performance (3-year) 0.0024∗
× Local market density 1 (0.0014)
Negative performance (3-year) 0.0001
× Local market density 1 (0.0006)
Positive performance (3-year) 0.0022∗
× Local market density 2 (0.0012)
Negative performance (3-year) -0.0004
× Local market density 2 (0.0006)
Average executive age -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗ -0.0005∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗ -0.0006∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Average executive tenure 0.0005 0.0005 0.0002 0.0005 0.0005
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Average executive ownership -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Firm size 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0031∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗ 0.0025∗∗∗
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
Firm age 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Board size 0.0010 0.0009 0.0007 0.0009 0.0008
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Board independence 0.0030 0.0045 0.0026 0.0031 0.0051
(0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0064) (0.0063)
E-Index -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0001
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Observations 24,022 24,022 24,022 24,022 24,022
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.004
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Table 3.6: Local Market Density and Dismissed Executive Subsequent Employment
Notes: The table presents the effects of local market density on dismissed executive subsequent
employment outcome. The sample consists of executives from S&P 500 firms who left their firms
during 2000-2010 for the reason other than death, health, acceptance of a new position, firm spin-off,
and who were under the age of 55 at the time of departure. The dependent variable in columns (1)
to (3) is a new employment dummy, which equals one if the executive obtains an executive position
in a new firm in three years and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in column (4) is a public
firm dummy, which equals one if the executive’s new employer is a firm covered by Compustat.
Column (5) adjusts the public firm dummy in column (4) by quality. For each new employment in
a public firm, the quality is measured as the ratio of the new firm’s size to the old firm’s size. The
dependent column (6) is the length of unemployment, which is calculated as the number of days
the executive was out of work divided by 365. Column (1) includes observations in which no news
is found on either departure or new employment. Columns (2) to (6) include only observations in
which news are found. Columns (1) uses an OLS model and includes an additional explanatory
variable indicating there is no news found. Columns (2) to (4) use logit models. Column (5) uses a
tobit model with lower bound zero. Column (6) uses a tobit model with lower bound zero and upper
bound three. Coefficients are reported in all columns. See main text and Appendix for definition of
departure reasons and other variables. The omitted departure reason is resign. Year fixed effects are
included in all specifications. Standard errors reported in the parentheses are robust and clustered
by firm. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Employment outcome after dismissal
Including Main Main Public Quality Length of
no news sample sample firms weighted unemployment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Local market density 1 -0.0095 -0.0778 -0.1082 -0.0762 0.1700∗
(0.0105) (0.0769) (0.0879) (0.0680) (0.1004)
Local market density 2 -0.0305
(0.0700)
Forced -0.0010 -0.0503 -0.0586 -0.0061 0.0031 0.2452
(0.0582) (0.2611) (0.2609) (0.3518) (0.2690) (0.3487)
Pursue 0.0906 0.4072 0.4157 0.0441 0.0469 -0.6322∗
(0.0602) (0.2630) (0.2624) (0.3125) (0.2398) (0.3548)
Retire -0.2159∗∗∗ -1.2287∗∗∗ -1.2136∗∗∗ -1.0592∗∗∗ -0.7797∗∗∗ 1.5650∗∗∗
(0.0395) (0.2649) (0.2640) (0.3344) (0.2357) (0.3544)
Age -0.0014 -0.0084 -0.0076 -0.0062 -0.0050 0.0225
(0.0029) (0.0266) (0.0266) (0.0313) (0.0241) (0.0356)
Compensation 0.0157 0.1661 0.1471 -0.0221 -0.0166 -0.2886∗
(0.0132) (0.1188) (0.1168) (0.1340) (0.1009) (0.1676)
Previous CEO -0.1248∗ -0.6494 -0.6380 -0.4109 -0.2787 0.7394
(0.0679) (0.4259) (0.4204) (0.5010) (0.3892) (0.5860)
Firm size 0.0084 0.0483 0.0524 0.1148 0.0888∗ -0.0349
(0.0082) (0.0600) (0.0592) (0.0732) (0.0530) (0.0829)
Industry adjusted return 0.0038 0.0015 0.0010 -0.1323 -0.1098 0.0737
(0.0171) (0.0893) (0.0893) (0.1928) (0.1439) (0.1197)
Observations 893 577 577 577 577 577
Adjusted R2 0.182 0.071 0.070 0.053 0.040 0.042
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Table 3.7: Local Hiring Bias of Dismissed Executives
Notes: The table presents the local hiring percentage for a sample of dismissed executives who find
a new job in a public firm within a three-year window. The sample of dismissed executives is same
as the sample used in Table 3.6. Panel A shows the realized local hiring percentage and local hiring
bias for the sample of dismissed executives. The columns are same as the columns in Table 2.1.
Four different measures of expected local hiring probability and three distance cutoffs are used. See
Table 2.1 for details. Panel B compares the local hiring bias between the dismissed sample and the
non-dismissed sample. The non-dismissed sample is the 19,692 executive job changes covered by the
BoardEx database used in Table 2.1. Columns (1) and (2) report the mean local hiring bias for the
dismissed and the non-dismissed samples, respectively. Column (3) shows the difference between
columns (1) and (2). Column (4) shows the t-statistic of a mean comparison test on local hiring bias
between the dismissed and the non-dismissed sample under the assumption of unequal variance.
Panel A: Local hiring bias: Dismissed sample
Hiring # Local # Local % Exp # Exp % Bias (pp)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
p1, 60-mile 105 21 20.0 5 5.1 14.9
p1, 100-mile 105 23 21.9 7 6.4 15.5
p1, 250-mile 105 35 33.3 13 12.2 21.2
p2, 60-mile 105 21 20.0 3 3.2 16.8
p2, 100-mile 105 23 21.9 4 4.0 17.9
p2, 250-mile 105 35 33.3 8 8.0 25.3
p3, 60-mile 105 21 20.0 11 10.5 9.5
p3, 100-mile 105 23 21.9 13 12.0 9.9
p3, 250-mile 105 35 33.3 23 21.7 11.7
p4, 60-mile 105 21 20.0 11 10.3 9.7
p4, 100-mile 105 23 21.9 12 11.0 10.9
p4, 250-mile 105 35 33.3 19 18.5 14.9
Panel B: Comparison between dismissed and non-dismissed samples
Dismissed
Non-
dismissed’
Difference t-stat
(1) (2) (3) (4)
p1, 60-mile 14.9 28.7 -13.8 3.57
p1, 100-mile 15.5 29.3 -13.9 3.45
p1, 250-mile 21.2 30.7 -9.5 2.07
p2, 60-mile 16.8 30.7 -13.9 3.55
p2, 100-mile 17.9 31.8 -13.9 3.45
p2, 250-mile 25.3 35.0 -9.8 2.14
p3, 60-mile 9.5 24.5 -15.0 3.55
p3, 100-mile 9.9 24.7 -14.8 3.36
p3, 250-mile 11.7 23.5 -11.9 2.28
p4, 60-mile 9.7 25.1 -15.3 3.31
p4, 100-mile 10.9 25.7 -14.9 3.13
p4, 250-mile 14.9 25.5 -10.6 1.93
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Chapter 4
LOCAL MARKET DENSITY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
Chapter 3 shows that market density creates non-compensation incentives for
executives through dismissal threat and outside tournament incentives. A natural
question to study next is whether market density affects firm performance through
the incentive channels.
Previous studies show that executives respond to non-compensation incentives and
thus improve firm performance (Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Green and Stokey, 1983;
Kale et al., 2009; Coles et al., 2013). Based on this stream of literature, I hypothesize
that firms located in denser markets have better performance. The empirical challenge
here is that local market density could have an impact on performance through a
variety of channels other than managerial incentives. Therefore, a simple positive
correlation between market density and firm performance does not translate into
sufficient evidence on the incentive mechanism proposed in this paper.
To distinguish the incentive channel from others, I combine non-compensation
incentives induced by market density with executive’s career horizon. Specifically,
in a performance regression analysis, I interact market density with executive’s ex-
pected years remaining prior to retirement, and examine whether the coefficient of
the interaction term is positive. The intuition is based on Gibbons and Murphy
(1992), who point out that “implicit incentives...should be weakest for workers close
to retirement.” Since an executive cares less about both dismissal and promotion
as she approaches retirement, the effect of implicit incentives on performance should
decrease with her age. A nice feature of this identification strategy is that most mech-
anisms other than incentive alignment work through the channel of firms rather than
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executives and thus do not interact with career horizon, leaving incentive alignment
to be the most possible explanation for a positive coefficient on the interaction term.
Table 4.1 presents the regression results on firm performance. I use two-digit SIC
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q as the main performance measure. To control for the
effect of other well documented managerial incentives on firm performance, I add
CEO stock ownership and intra-firm pay gap in all model specifications. Columns (1)
and (2) report the preliminary results of how market density affects firm performance.
Consistent with the incentive argument, the coefficients on Local market density 1 and
Local market density 2 are both positive and statistically significant at the 5% level.
In terms of economic magnitude, an interquartile increase in market density raises
industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q by about 0.06. As for other variables, the coefficient on
intra-firm pay gap is positive, indicating that intra-firm tournament incentives also
have positive effects on firm performance (Kale et al. (2009)).
Although the results in columns (1) and (2) suggest that market density improves
firm performance, it alone does not indicate that managerial incentive alignment is the
underlying channel. Therefore, in columns (3) and (4), I apply the interaction strategy
as described above. Since most executives retire at the age of 60, I measure the average
executive’s career horizon of a firm-year observation as 60 minus the average age of
the executives in that firm year. After including executive horizon and the interaction
term, I find that the coefficient on Local market density 1 becomes insignificant while
the coefficient of the interaction term is positive and significant at the 5% level. Theses
two results suggest that one main channel through which market density affects firm
performance is managerial non-compensation incentives. As for economic magnitude,
a 0.0082 coefficient on the interaction term implies that the marginal effect of market
density on Tobin’s Q is 0.011 (−0.0380 + 6 × 0.0082) for firms with top-quartile
average executive age (54), and increases to 0.065 (−0.0380 + 12.4× 0.0082) for firms
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with bottom-quartile executive age (47.6). Comparing a firm in a dense market (top
quartile 6.28) with young executives (bottom quartile 47.6) with a firm in a non-dense
market (bottom quartile 4.25) with old executives (bottom quartile 54), I find that
the industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q of the former firm is higher than that of the latter
one by 0.27. As the mean (median) Tobin’s Q is 1.97 (1.45), such difference in firm
performance is substantial. Similar results are obtained in column (4) where Local
market density 2 is used. The interacted effect is still positive and significant at the
5% level. 1
In columns (5) to (6), I replace industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q with industry-adjusted
ROA as an alternative performance measure. The significantly positive coefficients
on the interaction term reinforce the findings in columns (3) and (4). Firms in dense
markets with young executives have a 0.017 higher industry-adjusted ROA than firms
in non-dense markets with old executives.
In sum, combining market density with executive career horizon, Table 4.1 sug-
gests that firms in denser labor markets have better performance as their executives
face stronger non-compensation incentives.
1One might be concerned that the interaction effect is driven by nonlinearity in the density
effect and correlation between density and executive age. I find that the interaction effect remains
quantitatively unchanged if I include quadratic and inverse terms of density in regressions.
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Table 4.1: Local Market Density and Firm Performance
Notes: The table presents the OLS regression of firm performance on local market density. The
sample consists of firms with available data from 1996 to 2013. The dependent variable is industry-
adjusted Tobin’s Q in columns (1) to (4) and industry-adjusted ROA in columns (5) to (6). Local
market density 1 is the logarithm of one plus total number of firms within 60 miles of the firm’s
headquarters. Local market density 2 is the logarithm of one plus total number of firms, each scaled
by employment size, within 60 miles of the firm’s headquarters. 60−Average executive age is 60
minus the average age of executives in the firm-year observation. See Appendix for definition of
other variables. Industry (two-digit SIC) and year fixed effects are included in all specifications.
Standard errors reported in the parentheses are robust and clustered by firm. *,**,*** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q Industry-adjusted ROA
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Local market density 1 0.0283∗∗ -0.0380 0.0042∗
(0.0134) (0.0253) (0.0022)
Local market density 2 0.0269∗∗ -0.0285 0.0042∗
(0.0137) (0.0246) (0.0023)
(60−Average executive age) 0.0082∗∗ 0.0005∗∗
× Local market density 1 (0.0034) (0.0002)
(60−Average executive age) 0.0069∗∗ 0.0004∗
× Local market density 2 (0.0034) (0.0002)
60−Average executive age -0.0125 -0.0041 -0.0028∗∗ -0.0024∗
(0.0161) (0.0154) (0.0012) (0.0013)
CEO ownership 0.0055 0.0055 0.0066∗ 0.0066∗ 0.0007∗∗ 0.0007∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Intra-firm pay gap 0.0406∗∗∗ 0.0406∗∗∗ 0.0404∗∗∗ 0.0405∗∗∗ 0.0021∗∗∗ 0.0020∗∗∗
(0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Firm age -0.0097∗∗∗ -0.0097∗∗∗ -0.0076∗∗∗ -0.0076∗∗∗ -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Firm size -0.0770∗∗∗ -0.0768∗∗∗ -0.0727∗∗∗ -0.0726∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.0002
(0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0167) (0.0019) (0.0019)
Sale growth 0.2552∗ 0.2554∗ 0.2484∗ 0.2488∗ 0.0006 0.0006
(0.1359) (0.1359) (0.1332) (0.1333) (0.0022) (0.0022)
R&D intensity 0.2492∗∗∗ 0.2511∗∗∗ 0.2568∗∗∗ 0.2591∗∗∗ 0.0479∗∗∗ 0.0477∗∗∗
(0.0467) (0.0467) (0.0461) (0.0463) (0.0046) (0.0046)
Board size -0.0090 -0.0092 -0.0019 -0.0023 0.0006 0.0006
(0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0074) (0.0075) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Board independence 0.0725 0.0745 -0.0052 -0.0035 0.0147 0.0147
(0.1643) (0.1643) (0.1665) (0.1665) (0.0122) (0.0123)
E-Index -0.1184∗∗∗ -0.1186∗∗∗ -0.1146∗∗∗ -0.1150∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.0004
(0.0165) (0.0165) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Observations 27,230 27,230 27,230 27,230 26,526 26,526
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.078 0.087 0.086 0.043 0.043
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Chapter 5
COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE ENFORCEABILITY
To provide further evidence for the effects of local labor market density on man-
agerial incentives and firm performance, I exploit heterogeneity with respect to execu-
tive’s mobility across firms. Since the effects of market density on incentive alignment
hinge on movements of executives within local labor markets, the effects would be
weaker if executives are not allowed to move freely. To characterize executive mobil-
ity, I use the enforceability of state-level covenants not to compete (CNC).1 CNCs are
often used by employers to prevent employees from working for competitors. For ex-
ample, based on a nationally representative sample of 11,505 labor force participants,
Starr et al. (2016) find that 38% of employees have signed a CNC at some time in
their career, and 18% of employees are currently working under a CNC. The use of
CNCs are more prevalent among top executives. Garmaise (2009) finds that at least
70% of Execucomp firms use CNCs with their top executives.
Almost all states, except California and North Dakota, have some form of covenant
that prevents a firm’s employee from moving to competing firms. However, the en-
forceability of the covenants varies widely across states, in terms of geographical and
time restrictions, employer’s protectable interest, employee’s burden of proof, etc.
The variation in enforceability allows me to examine the heterogeneous effects with
respect to executive mobility. Malsberger (2004) provides a comprehensive descrip-
tion of CNCs in the fifty U.S. states and the District of Columbia. I follow Garmaise
(2009) and measure enforceability by summing up the scores of 12 questions regard-
1CNCs well fit my study on local labor market as they usually have a restricted geographic scope,
such as a state, a county, or a 50 mile radius around the place of business.
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ing a jurisdiction’s enforcement of CNCs. States with higher enforceability scores
have lower executive market mobility (Garmaise, 2009). States on average have an
enforceability score of four, with Florida being the highest with a score of nine and
California and North Dakota being the lowest with a score of zero. The interquartile
range is from three to five. A complete list of questions and state scores is provided
in Garmaise (2009).
To examine how the effects of local market density vary across markets with
different enforceability of CNCs, for each firm-year observation I interact the density
measure with the enforceability measure of the state where the firm is headquartered.
For the analysis on CEO turnover-performance sensitivity and firm performance, I
use a three-way interaction and include all the relevant interaction terms. To keep the
coefficients on the non-interacted main terms similar to the original results, I demean
the enforceability measure in each regression before interaction.
Table 5.1 presents the results. In columns (1) and (2), I investigate how CNCs
affect executive’s dismissal threat due to local competition. Consistent with the ar-
gument that CNCs shrink the outside candidate pool from which firms can choose
replacement executives, the effect of market density on CEO turnover-performance
sensitivity is smaller in states where CNCs are more enforceable. The coefficient on
the three-way interaction term is significantly positive at the 10% level. Correspond-
ingly, as shown in column (2), CNCs also reduce the positive effect of market density
on firm’s outside succession rate. Columns (3) and (4) look at executive’s outside
tournament incentives. For tournament prize, as the effect of market density on lo-
cal pay gap does not necessarily come from the movements of local executives, the
enforceability of CNCs might not strengthen or weaken the density effect. However,
for tournament likelihood, CNCs could shrink outside opportunities for executives
and thus reduces the density effect. Consistent with these arguments, I find that the
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coefficient of the interaction is not statistically significant in the tournament prize
regression in column (3), while it is significant at the 5% level in the tournament
likelihood regression in column (4). An interquartile increase in enforceability score
reduces the effect of density on tournament likelihood by 50% relative to the average
effect. In column (5), I reexamine the effect of market density on dismissed exec-
utive’s subsequent employment. Similar to the result in the main analysis, market
density does not help dismissed executives find a new job more easily and this result
does not change across different levels of CNC enforceability.
Combining the results in columns (1) to (5), I find that the positive effects of
market density on managerial incentive alignment are stronger in the environment
where CNC enforcement is weaker, i.e., executives are allowed to move more freely.
Therefore, I expect the positive effect of density on firm performance, through the
channel of managerial incentives, is also stronger for firms in states with lower CNC
enforceability. Consistent with this hypothesis, I find in column (6) that the coefficient
on the three-way interaction term of market density, executive career horizon, and
CNC enforceability, is significantly negative. As for the magnitude, an interquartile
increase in enforceability score reduces the interaction effect of market density and
career horizon by half.
Overall, using CNC enforceability as an exogenous measure of executive market
mobility, I find that the effects of local market density on executive’s dismissal threat
and tournament incentives are more pronounced in more mobile markets. Accord-
ingly, market mobility also strengthens the executive career horizon channel through
which density enhances firm performance.
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Table 5.1: Covenants Not to Compete Enforceability
Notes: The table presents the heterogeneous effects of local market density on managerial incen-
tives and firms performance by the enforceability of state-level covenants not to compete (CNC).
Noncompete is an index summing up the score that each state obtains from 12 questions regard-
ing the jurisdiction’s enforcement of CNC. For each firm, CNC enforceability is measured using
the enforceability index of the state where the firm is headquartered. Noncompete is demeaned in
each regression and then interacted with market density. For three-way interaction in turnover-
performance sensitivity and firm performance analysis, all possible interaction terms are included
in regressions. Column (1) replicates Table 3.2 column (2), where the dependent variable is forced
CEO turnover. Column (2) replicates Table 3.3 column (1), where the dependent variable is outside
CEO succession. Column (3) replicates Table 3.4 column (1), where the dependent variable is local
total compensation gap. Column (4) replicates Table 3.5 column (1), where the dependent variable
is the number of executive local tournaments. Column (5) replicates Table 3.6 column (2), where
the dependent variable is a new employment dummy for previously dismissed executives. Column
(6) replicates Table 4.1 column (3), where the dependent variable is industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q.
For brevity, only coefficients of density, CNC enforceability, and key interaction terms are reported.
See Appendix and previous tables for model specifications and the definition of variables. *,**,***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Turnover- Outside Local Local New Tobin’s
performance CEO pay gap tournaments employment Q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Local market density 1 0.1092∗∗ 0.1319∗∗∗ 0.7061∗∗∗ 0.0047∗∗∗ -0.0353 -0.0304
(0.0430) (0.0387) (0.0383) (0.0007) (0.0867) (0.0260)
Noncompete -0.0372 0.0880 0.2572∗∗ 0.0030∗ 0.2617 -0.0651
(0.0257) (0.1014) (0.1083) (0.0016) (0.2753) (0.0405)
Local market density 1 -0.0221 -0.0317∗ -0.0277 -0.0011∗∗ -0.0398 0.0153∗
× Noncompete (0.0202) (0.0184) (0.0189) (0.0005) (0.0472) (0.0084)
Negative performance -0.2317∗∗
× Local market density 1 (0.1129)
Negative performance 0.0803∗
× Local market density 1 (0.0482)
× Noncompete
(60−Average executive age) 0.0080∗∗
× Local market density 1 (0.0036)
(60−Average executive age) -0.0025∗∗
× Local market density 1 (0.0012)
× Noncompete
Observations 21,756 2,456 25,691 24,022 577 27,230
(pseudo) R2 0.096 0.103 0.287 0.006 0.072 0.092
Other controls for Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6 Table 7 Table 9
all panels as in: column 2 column 1 column 1 column 1 column 2 column 3
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Chapter 6
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
In this section, I test the robustness of the results in Chapters 2 and 3 by con-
sidering alternative density measures and examining a set of potential confounding
factors.
6.1 Alternative Density Measures
In the analyses so far, I use the number of all firms in the local area as the
measure of local market density. Yet, if firms mainly focus on industry insiders when
making hiring decisions, a measure including only firms in the same industry as the
sample firm could be more appropriate. Hence, as a robustness check, I consider
two additional measures of market density Local market density 3 and Local market
density 4, which are equal to the unadjusted and size-adjusted number of local firms
in the same two-digit SIC industry as the sample firm, respectively. On average,
a firm has 20 other local firms in its industry. The correlation between density 1
(density 2) and density 3 (density 4) is 0.677 (0.564).
Panels A and B in Table 6.1 replicate the analyses in Chapters 2 and 3 with the
new density measures. Column (1) corresponds to Table 3.2 columns (2) and (3),
where the dependent variable is forced CEO turnover. Consistent with the previous
findings, the coefficients of the interaction term are negative in both panels. Yet,
the statistical significance decreases to being significant at the 10% level. Column
(2) looks at firm’s outside succession choice and finds similar results as in Table
3.3. I reexamine executives’ outside tournament incentives in columns (3) and (4),
where dependent variables are changed to the within industry (two-digit SIC) local
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compensation gap and local outside tournament, respectively. The results confirm the
previous findings that executives in denser markets have higher outside tournament
likelihood as well as larger tournament prize. Column (5) replicates Table 3.6 and
finds that local market density still has no effect on dismissed executives’ subsequent
employment. Finally, column (6) replicates the firm performance analysis in Table
4.1. Similar to the main findings, the coefficients on the interaction are significantly
positive, implying that market density improves firm performance through managerial
incentive alignment.
6.2 Potential Confounding Factors
In this section, I consider several market characteristics correlated with market
density and examine whether my main results of density on incentives and perfor-
mance are robust to the control of these characteristics.
6.2.1 Board Governance
The first confounding factor I examine is board monitoring efficiency. Knyazeva
et al. (2013) argue that firm’s ability to recruit independent directors significantly
depends on the local supply of prospective directors. They find empirically that
for all firms but the largest quartile of S&P 1500, board independence is positively
related to the number of nonfinancial firms within 60 miles. Board independence could
have a direct impact on managerial incentives and firm performance. For example,
Weisbach (1988) shows that turnover-performance sensitivity is higher for firms with
more independent boards. The stronger monitoring role played by independent board
could also lead to better firm performance, although the effect is heterogeneous across
firms with different characteristics (Coles et al., 2008).
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To examine how board independence affects the results of market density, I run
a horse race test between my density measure and board independence for all main
regressions studied in the paper. Since some managerial incentive outcomes could be
affected not only by the board independence level of the event firm but also by its
level of other firms at local market, I also include local average board independence
in regressions.
In untabulated results, I find that controlling board independence channel has
virtually no impact on the positive effects of market density on dismissal threat,
tournament incentives, and firm performance. The main results do not change if I
replace board independence with board co-option as proposed in Coles et al. (2014),
though the coefficient of the interaction between density and negative performance
in the turnover-performance sensitivity losses statistical significance. Overall, there
is no empirical evidence that my main results are driven by board governance.
6.2.2 Institutional Ownership and Analyst Coverage
I next investigate the role of institutional investors and analysts. Previous litera-
ture shows that firms in denser markets are owned by more institutional investors and
are covered by more analysts, because these sophisticated investors typically located
in dense markets and tend to bias towards local firms (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999;
Loughran and Schultz, 2005; Malloy, 2005; Bae et al., 2008). As a result, market
density is positively correlated with external monitoring strength and information
dissemination efficiency, both of which could affect managerial incentives and firm
performance (Bushee and Noe, 2000, Boone and White, 2015).
To examine whether the effects of market density on incentives and performance
are confounded by external monitoring and information dissemination, I control for
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institutional ownership and analyst coverage.1 Untabulated regression results indicate
that conditional on external monitoring and information dissemination, local market
density still has significant effects on executive’s dismissal threat and tournament
incentives. The economic magnitudes are similar to those in the baseline models.
As for firm performance, the coefficient on executive horizon and market density
interaction term is positive and statistically significant at least at the 5% level.
6.2.3 Managerial Skill
Finally, I examine whether the positive effects of market density on incentives and
performance are driven by the sorting of skillful managers into dense markets. To
empirically test this channel, I measure a firm’s managerial skill as the percentage of
its top executives holding MBA degrees.2 I find that executives in denser markets are
more likely to hold MBA degrees. Yet, there is no evidence that managerial sorting
is the driving force behind the positive effects of density on managerial incentives
and firm performance. With the control of managerial skill, the coefficients of market
density and corresponding interaction terms are in similar economic magnitude and
statistical significance as those reported in baseline regressions.
1Analyst coverage information comes from IBES and institutional holdings information comes
from Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings (13F) database.
2Data on executive education level are from BoardEx. The results do not change if I consider
doctorate degree or master degree. I do not use managerial skill measures derived from firm perfor-
mance (e.g.,Demerjian et al. (2012)), because these measures do not distinguish between skill and
incentive alignment.
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Table 6.1: Alternative Market Density Measures
Notes: The table presents the results for robustness checks on alternative measures of local market
density. Local market density 3 is the logarithm of one plus number of firms within 60 miles of sample
firm’s headquarters and within sample firm’s industry. Local market density 4 adjusts each firm
count in Local market density 3 by firm employment size. Column (1) replicates Table 3.2 columns
(2) and (3), where the dependent variable is forced CEO turnover. Column (2) replicates Table 3.3
columns (1) and (2), where the dependent variable is outside CEO succession. Column (3) resembles
Table 3.4 columns (1) and (4), but changes the dependent variable to the compensation gap between
sample firm total compensation and the 90th percentile total compensation of local same industry
firms. Column (4) resembles Table 3.5 columns (1) and (2), but changes the dependent variable
to the number of executive local and within-industry tournaments. Column (5) replicates Table
3.6 columns (2) and (3), where the dependent variable is new employment dummy for previously
dismissed executives. Column (6) replicates Table 4.1 columns (3) and (4), where the dependent
variable is industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q. Industries are classified based on two-digit SIC codes. For
brevity, only coefficients of density and density interaction terms are reported. See Appendix and
previous tables for model specifications and the definition of variables. *,**,*** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Turnover- Outside Local Local New Tobin’s
performance CEO pay gap tournaments employment Q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Local executive pool 3
Local market density 3 0.0651∗ 0.1044∗∗∗ 1.7009∗∗∗ 0.0034∗∗∗ -0.0334 -0.0610
(0.0351) (0.0344) (0.0271) (0.0005) (0.0642) (0.0417)
Negative performance -0.1670∗
× Local market density 3 (0.0970)
(60−Average executive age) 0.0134∗∗
× Local market density 3 (0.0054)
Observations 21,756 2,456 25,691 24,022 577 27,230
(pseudo) R2 0.092 0.089 0.434 0.004 0.070 0.095
Panel B: Local executive pool 4
Local market density 4 0.0701∗∗ 0.1023∗∗∗ 1.6792∗∗∗ 0.0030∗∗∗ -0.0404 -0.0522
(0.352) (0.0313) (0.0275) (0.0005) (0.0553) (0.0359)
Negative performance -0.1723∗
× Local market density 4 (0.0975)
(60−Average executive age) 0.0119∗∗
× Local market density 4 (0.0048)
Observations 21,756 2,456 25,691 24,022 577 27,230
(pseudo) R2 0.092 0.089 0.507 0.005 0.071 0.093
Other controls for Table 3 Table 4 Table 5 Table 6 Table 7 Table 9
all panels as in: column 2 column 1 column 1 column 1 column 2 column 3
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Chapter 7
CONCLUSION
Recent empirical findings shake the conventional wisdom that the market for CEOs
is nationally integrated. To provide more direct evidence on geographic segmentation
of the executive labor markets, I use executive job changes covered by the BoardEx
database and calculate the distance between executive’s old and new employers’ head-
quarters. I find that firms hire executives within 60-mile radius seven times more
frequently than expected if the executive market were nationally integrated.
Since executives often move locally, they are affected by local labor market condi-
tions beyond national ones. Firms in denser markets tend to dismiss poor performing
executives more frequently due to more convenient access to outside candidates. This
implies stronger performance-based dismissal threat for executives in denser markets.
Besides dismissal threat, outside tournament incentives work as another mechanism
of incentive alignment. Executives in denser labor market have better outside oppor-
tunities, in terms of both larger compensation gap and higher tournament likelihood.
The empirical findings also rule out the concern that market density might disincen-
tivize executives by offering more backup options. Dismissed executives in denser
markets do not find new jobs more easily because reputation spreads in local mar-
kets. Combining incentives with career horizon, I find that local market density has
a positive effect on firm performance, especially when executives are young.
The results in this paper illustrate the point that local market density creates in-
centives for executives and hence affects firm outcomes. So managerial non-compensation
incentives could be used to explain the impacts of geographic clustering on firms.
Also, researchers should be careful when implementing geographic conditions as in-
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strumental variables since market density has a direct impact on executive incentives.
One potential revenue for future research is to investigate whether incentive align-
ment through market density affects firms other than just aggregate performance. For
example, the option-like features of tournament opportunities could give executive in-
centives to increase firm risk in terms of higher R&D intensity, more M&A activities,
or higher leverage (Kini and Williams, 2012, Coles et al., 2013). On the other hand,
dismissal threat might suppress such risk-taking behavior as executives are worried
about poor performance. It would be interesting to see which non-compensation in-
centive dominates and whether firms respond by adjusting the optimal compensation
structure.
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APPENDIX A
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
57
The appendix defines the variables used in the paper. All accounting data items
come from Compustat and are denoted as data numbers. All returns data come from
CRSP. All compensation related data come from Execucomp. Governance data and
board data come from ISS.
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Table A.1: Data Sources and Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Firm characteristics
Local market density 1 Logarithm of one plus the number of firms within 60 miles of the firm’s head-
quarter
Local market density 2 Logarithm of one plus size scaled number of firms within 60 miles of the firm’s
headquarter. Size scale for each firm is calculated as firm’s number of employees
divided by the average number of employees of Compustat firms in that year
Local market density 3 Logarithm of one plus the number of firms within 60 miles of the firm’s head-
quarter and within the firm’s two-digit SIC industry
Local market density 4 Logarithm of one plus size scaled number of firms within 60 miles of the firm’s
headquarter and within the firm’s two-digit SIC industry
Firm size Logarithm of toal assets; log(data 6)
Sales Net annual sales; data 12
Market value Market capitalization; data 199 × data 25
Sales growth Ratio of net sale in year t to net sale in year t− 1 minus one
Firm age Current year minus the first year that the firm appeared in Compustat
R&D intensity (%) Percent of research and development expenditure to capital; data 46 / data 8;
zero if missing
Tobin’s Q Market value of asset to book value; (data 6 + data 199 × data 25 − (data 60 +
data 74)) / data 6
Industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q minus median two-digit SIC industry Tobin’s Q
ROA Ratio of operating income before depreciation to total asset; data 13 / data 6
Industry-adjusted ROA ROA minus median two-digit SIC industry ROA
Stock return Cumulative stock return 12 months before the current fiscal year end
Industry return Median two-digit SIC industry return
Industry-adjusted return Stock return minus median two-digit SIC industry return
Negative performance Equal to industry-adjusted return if the industry-adjusted return is negative, and
zero otherwise
Positive performance Equal to industry-adjusted return if the industry-adjusted return is non-negative,
and zero otherwise
Board size Number of directors on the board
Board independence Percent of independent directors on the board
E-Index Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) index of corporate governance; similar to
existing work, gap years are filled in with adjoining years
Noncompete Covenants not to compete enforceability score of the state where the firm is
headquartered; state-level enforceability score is an index summing up the score
that each state obtains from 12 questions regarding the jurisdiction’s enforcement
of covenants not to compete (Garmaise, 2009)
Executive characteristics
CEO age Current age of the CEO
CEO chairman CEO is chairman of the board
CEO tenure Current year minus the first year when the executive was flaged as CEO in Exe-
cucomp
CEO ownership Percent ownership stake of the CEO in the firm
Average executive age Average age of executives in a firm-year observation
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Table A.1 continued
Variable Definition
Average executive tenure Average years that executives have been covered by Execucomp under the firm
Average executive ownership Average percent ownership stake of executives
Intra-firm pay gap Logarithm of CEO total compensation (TDC1) minus median compensation of
non-CEO executives within firm; zero if the difference is non-positive
Forced CEO turnover CEO in year t+ 1 is different from the CEO in year t; and report says that the
CEO is fired, forced out, or departs due to policy differences; or the departing
CEO is under age of 60, does not announce the retirement at least six months in
advance, and does not leave for health reasons or acceptance of another position
Outside CEO CEO has been with the firm for less than one year before being CEO
Outside non-CEO executive Executive has been with the firm for less than one year before the first time
listed on that firm’s annual proxy
Local pay gap (Top5, TDC1) Logarithm of the 90th percentile of firm total compensation (TDC1) in local
market (within 60 miles) minus firm total compensation; zero if the difference is
non-positive. Firm compensation is calculated as the mean compensation of its
top five executives
Number of local tournament Number of local tournaments won by top five executives of a firm in a year. A
local tournament is recored if (i) an executive changes employer, (ii) the moving
distance is less than 60 miles, and (iii) the new job’s compensation (TDC1
deflated by CPI) is higher than the old one’s
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APPENDIX B
LOCAL HIRING BIAS BY SUBSAMPLES
61
I provide further evidence on local hiring bias by categorizing all hiring events
into different groups.
I first examine whether the benefit of firm conducting a nationwide search or
the benefit of executive moving long distance has any heterogeneous effect on the
magnitude of the local hiring bias. I also examine the role of firm agency problem
and executive geographic preference. Results are presented in Table B.1. For brevity,
I only show the results using p1 as expected local hiring measure. Similar results are
obtained if alternative measures are used.
Panel A categorizes sample hiring firms based on their S&P code. As the benefit
of finding a suitable leader is higher for larger firms, larger firms should be more likely
to hire executives from a nationwide executive pool. The results in Panel A offers
evidence supporting this argument. The local hiring bias is strongest, at 32.7%, for
firms that are not included in S&P 1500 index. The bias decreases to 30.0% for S&P
SmallCap firms, further decreases to 24.8% for MidCap firms, and becomes lowest
for S&P 500 firms at 23.9%. 1 Results remain qualitatively unchanged if I categorize
sample hiring firms by size quintiles.
In Panel B, I examine whether local hirings happen less frequently for jobs with
higher payment. If compensation reflects the importance of the job, firms are more
likely to conduct a nationwide search for that position. As for employees, higher
monetary benefit is more likely to overweigh the moving cost and hence induces a
long distance move. For the subsample in which compensation data are available
through Execucomp, I sort the full sample into quintiles based on the total compen-
sation (TDC1) that executives receive at the new position. To control for the rapid
compensation increase in the last two decades, I scale each compensation with the
1The sample median total assets is 0.41 for firms not in S&P Index, 0.52 for SmallCap firms, 1.81
for MidCap firms, and 11.52 for S&P 500 firms. All amounts are in billions of 2000 dollars.
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average compensation level in that year. I find that jobs with compensation at the
lowest quintile have the highest local hiring bias at 30.7%. This bias gradually de-
creases as compensation level rises. The bias for jobs with payment at the highest
quintile is 20.7%, which is significantly (at the 1% level) different from the bias at
the lowest quintile.
In Panel C, I examine whether local hirings are driven by agency stories. Firms
with weaker governance might be more likely to hire local executives for some private
benefits their boards and CEOs receive. However, using board independence as a
proxy of agency problems, I do not find evidence that the local hiring bias varies
monotonically across firms with different level of agency problems.
Panels D and E investigate whether executive’s geographic preference explains the
local bias. In Panel D, I find a hump-shaped relation between executive age and the
local moving bias. Executives with age between 35 and 50 are most likely to relocate
within their current geographic area when changing jobs. One possible explanation is
that these executives are married and with young kids, so they are not willing to move
across the nation. In Panel E, I look at whether executives in more livable places are
more inclined to move locally. Following Deng and Gao (2013), I use state livability
ranking in 2006 (sample median year) published by Morgan Quitno. 2 Surprisingly,
it seems that executives in less livable states are actually more likely to move locally,
if anything.
I also study whether the local hiring bias changes over time in Panel F. One might
expect that with the increase in information and transportation convenience, firm’s
searching cost and executive’s moving cost would become lower in the latter sample
period and thus executive labor markets would become more integrated. However, I
2The ranking is based on a score of 44 factors, including positive factors, such as personal income,
education level, sunny days, and negative factors, such as crime rate, unemployment rate, population
per square mile.
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do not find such time pattern in my sample. In fact, it seems that the local hiring
bias becomes more substantial in recent years.
Finally, I investigate whether the local hiring bias only exists certain in industry
or in the densest area (e.g., cities like New York). I categorize all sample hiring firms
based on their Fama-French 30 industry classification and their market density, which
is measured as the total number of firms within 60 miles of hiring firm’s headquarter.
In untabulated results, I find that the local hiring bias is both economically and sta-
tistically significant across all industries and all density deciles. For most subsamples,
the bias is between 20% to 30%.
Overall, the subsample analysis indicates that the local hiring bias is prevalent
among all industries, all markets with different density, all time periods, and even in
the largest firms and highest paid positions. Furthermore, there is evidence that both
firm preference and executive preference play a role in the local hiring and moving
bias. Also, the local bias is better explained by the optimal matching between firms
and executives rather than by agency problems.
64
Table B.1: Local Hiring Bias: Subsamples
Hiring # Local # Local % Exp # Exp % Bias (pp)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: S&P codes
Not in S&P Index 9240 3492 37.8 467 5.1 32.7
SmallCap 1935 671 34.7 91 4.7 30.0
MidCap 2102 614 29.2 94 4.5 24.8
S&P 500 6415 1936 30.2 401 6.3 23.9
Panel B: Compensation
(Quintile 1: lowest)
Quintile 1 393 136 34.6 15 3.9 30.7
Quintile 2 393 127 32.3 15 3.8 28.5
Quintile 3 393 118 30.0 19 4.8 25.2
Quintile 4 393 113 28.8 19 4.8 23.9
Quintile 5 392 103 26.3 22 5.6 20.7
Panel C: Board independence
(Quintile 1: lowest)
Quintile 1 3664 1280 34.9 214 5.9 29.1
Quintile 2 3090 1036 33.5 166 5.4 28.2
Quintile 3 2966 1169 39.4 159 5.4 34.0
Quintile 4 2887 992 34.4 139 4.8 29.5
Quintile 5 2811 880 31.3 154 5.5 25.8
Panel D: Age
<30 299 90 30.1 17 5.6 24.5
30-34 904 306 33.8 48 5.3 28.5
35-39 1867 653 35.0 93 5.0 30.0
40-44 3044 1079 35.4 154 5.1 30.4
45-49 3113 1086 34.9 162 5.2 29.7
50-54 2358 754 32.0 119 5.0 26.9
55-59 1085 357 32.9 56 5.1 27.8
>=60 304 100 32.9 16 5.3 27.6
Panel E: State livability ranking
(1: highest)
1-10 3567 1198 33.6 200 5.6 28.0
11-20 1081 273 25.3 45 4.2 21.1
21-30 2830 735 26.0 134 4.7 21.3
31-40 10110 3849 38.1 596 5.9 32.2
41-50 2030 642 31.6 74 3.6 28.0
Panel F: Years
Before 1990 243 70 28.8 13 5.4 23.4
1990-1994 741 203 27.4 39 5.3 22.1
1995-1999 2239 670 29.9 116 5.2 24.7
2000-2004 4318 1372 31.8 219 5.1 26.7
2005-2009 7215 2631 36.5 384 5.3 31.1
After 2010 4936 1767 35.8 282 5.7 30.1
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